Adversarial Test on Learnable Image Encryption by AprilPyone, MaungMaung et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
13
34
2v
1 
 [e
es
s.I
V]
  3
1 J
ul 
20
19
Adversarial Test on Learnable Image Encryption
MaungMaung AprilPyone, Warit Sirichotedumrong and Hitoshi Kiya
Department of Computer Science, Graduate School of System Design
Tokyo Metropolitan University
Asahigaoka, Hino-shi, Tokyo, 191-0065, Japan
{april-pyone-maung-maung@ed.,warit-sirichotedumrong@ed.,kiya@}tmu.ac.jp
Abstract—Data for deep learning should be protected for
privacy preserving. Researchers have come up with the notion of
learnable image encryption to satisfy the requirement. However,
existing privacy preserving approaches have never considered the
threat of adversarial attacks. In this paper, we ran an adversarial
test on learnable image encryption in five different scenarios. The
results show different behaviors of the network in the variable
key scenarios and suggest learnable image encryption provides
certain level of adversarial robustness.
Index Terms—learnable image encryption, adversarial robust-
ness
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has brought major breakthroughs in computer
vision as well as other fields [1]. There is no doubt that it
is due to better algorithms, bigger data and faster computing
resources. With large amount of data, deep learning is often
carried out in the cloud environments where privacy issues
are generated. To securely transmit images through an un-
trusted channel, researchers have proposed Encryption-then-
Compression (EtC) systems such as [2]–[4]. Nevertheless,
most of the traditional image encryption schemes are not
compatible with deep learning. Recently, a learnable image
encryption method where a neural network can learn encrypted
images [5] and pixel-based image encryption designed for
deep neural networks [6] were proposed.
Although privacy issues have been addressed, the security
of deep learning has never been considered in the context of
learnable image encryption. Adversarially robust models are
extremely desired for privacy-preserving schemes because the
protected data are usually sensitive. Unexpected misclifica-
tions due to adversarial attacks will lead to severe damage
to applications such as medical analysis, surveillance, etc.
Therefore, security is quintessential in privacy-preserving deep
neural networks. In the literature, it has been shown that state-
of-the-art neural networks are vulnerable towards adversarial
examples [7], [8]. Adversarial examples can be generated by
optimization techniques to maximize the loss such as [9]–
[11]. Since then, deep learning has got significant amount of
attention towards adversarial robustness [12].
Our hypothesis is that encryption for privacy protection
can give us somewhat adversarial robustness. In this paper,
we run a test on a recent learnable encryption method [5]
where input images are encrypted and sent to the network
with an adaptation layer. From our experiments, we confirm
that learnable image encryption has somewhat resistance to
Fig. 1. An example of encrypted image.
Fig. 2. Encyption process of a block by Tanaka’s method [5].
adversarial examples. Our contribution in this paper is that we
conducted a test to raise a fundamental need of adversarial
robustness in the privacy-preserving network. We are also the
first to consider adversarial perspective in learnable image
encryption.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Learnable Image Encryption
Fig. 1 illustrates an example of encrypted image by Tanaka’s
encryption. There are 2 parts in Tanaka’s work: image encryp-
tion and adaptation layer [5].
The 8-bit pixel values in MxM blocks are separated into
upper and lower 4-bit to form the 6-channel blocks. The
intensities of pixel values are randomly reversed and shuffled.
The 6-channel blocks are reformed to 3-channel blocks. For
simplicity, the encryption process of one block is depicted in
Fig. 2.
The adaptation comprises of the first convolution layer
(MxM kernel and MxM stride), several network-in-network
style layers and sub-pixel convolution (pixel shuffle). After
the adaptation network, any network can be followed. Fig. 3
describes the diagram of Tanaka’s adaptation network.
B. Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are perceptually same images as the
original ones that are carefully designed to make the neural
Fig. 3. Diagram of adaptation network by Tanaka’s method [5].
Fig. 4. A sample of adversarial example generated by PGD.
network misclassify with high confidence. Fig. 4 shows an
example of adversarial example where the network classifies
“dog” as “horse” with 100% confidence.
There are many different ways of crafting adversarial exam-
ples. The popular and computationally efficient one is known
as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [9]. In this work, we
consider a stronger adversary (i.e., multi-step FGSM) known
as projected gradient descent (PGD) [10]:
xt+1 = clipǫ(x
t + α sign(∇xL(θ, x, y))), (1)
where ǫ is allowable perturbation size, xt is adversarial ex-
ample on tth PGD iteration, α is step size and ∇xL(θ, x, y)
represents the gradients of the loss function. Instead of mul-
tiplying the sign of the gradients with ǫ directly, PGD only
adds some step size α to the image in each iteration. PGD
also projects the perturbation back to the max-norm in each
step (i.e., clipǫ(.)).
C. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training is to train a network to be robust against
adversarial examples. There are many types of adversarial
defense. Madry et al. show that training against PGD leads to
robustness against other first-order adversaries [12]. Therefore,
we focus on PGD training in this work for experimental
purposes.
III. EXPERIMENTS
The flow diagram of the experiment is presented in Fig. 5.
First, we encrypted the data and used the encrypted images
to train the network by reusing the encryption code released
by the author in GitHub [13]. For the testing, We generated
adversarial noise by PGD, added the noise to the test images
and then, encrypted them.
The experiment setup is described as follows. We used
CIFAR10 [14] dataset with batch size of 128. Then, we
implemented Tanaka’s adaptation layer on deep residual net-
work (ResNet18) [15] on PyTorch platform. The network
Fig. 5. The flow diagram of the experiment (“Adv. Training” refers to
“Adversarial Training” ).
was trained for 100 epochs with stochastic gradient descent
optimization on learning rate of 0.1. We reduced the learning
rate to 0.01 after running for 40 epochs. All the images in
the dataset for all cases were in the range of [0, 1] with live
augumentation (random cropping and random horizontal flip).
However, there was no prior normalization. For the adversarial
testing and training, we used PGD [10] with ǫ = 0.1, α = 0.01
for 20 iterations.
Adversarial noise was generated iteratively as described
in (1). We used a slightly higher noise level (i.e., ǫ = 0.1) to
stress the experiment. The PGD process with the same settings
was employed in both adversarial testing and training.
We trained the network in 5 different scenarios and tested
against adversarial examples generated by PGD.
1) Plain: ResNet18 trained on clean images
2) Encrypted: ResNet18 with Tanaka’s adaptation layer
trained on encrypted images (one key for both training
and testing)
3) Encrypted-Adv: Adversarial training for encrypted im-
ages using the same key
4) Encrypted-DK: Same model as Encrypted except each
batch of the dataset was encrypted using a different
random key
5) Encrypted-Adv-DK: Adversarial training for encrypted
images using different random keys
IV. RESULTS
Table I summarizes the results of the experiments. The error
is the accuracy of misclassification (the lower the better). We
recorded the errors during training, testing and adversarial
testing. The results suggest the followings:
1) The standard model trained with plain images are com-
pletely vulnerable towards adversarial examples (i.e.,
100% misclassification).
2) Image encryption provides certain degree of robustness
against adversarial examples. The error rate of 0.269
is extremely good for adversarial robustness. Even the
state-of-the-art adversarially trained model had the ap-
proximate error rate of 0.530 for PGD attack with 20
TABLE I
ADVERSARIAL TEST RESULTS
Model
Error
Train Test Adversarial
Plain 0.006 0.137 1.000
Encrypted 0.011 0.166 0.269
Encrypted-Adv† 0.093 0.830 0.040
Encrypted-DK‡ 0.431 0.506 0.792
Encrypted-Adv†-DK‡ 0.657 0.617 0.690
†Adversarial, ‡Diffferent keys.
steps [16]. This confirms our hypothesis that the en-
cryption can give certain level of adversarial robustness.
3) Traditional adversarial training is not suitable for learn-
able image encryption. While doing adversarial training
with the same key, the network became biased towards
adversarial examples. The network could not generalize
the clean examples. Therefore, the network performed
poor on the test dataset.
4) The neural network requires uniform encryption for both
train and test data. Different keys transform the data into
different distributions. Therefore, when using different
keys for encryption, the network did not learn.
5) Since the network assumes encryption with one key,
adversarial training with different keys is not relevant.
We carried out the test for experimental purposes only.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Learnable image encryption provides good adversarial ro-
bustness. The same key is necessary to uniformly encrypt the
images. In addition, we can also conclude that the standard
adversarial training is not suitable for encrypted images. We
aim to achieve secure and private models with reasonable
accuracy as our future work.
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